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ABSTRACT 1 
 2 
Crowdfunding is an expanding form of alternative financing that is gaining traction in the 3 
health sector. This article presents a typology for crowdfunded health projects and a 4 
review of the main economic benefits and risks of crowdfunding in the health market. 5 
We use evidence from a literature review, complimented by expert interviews, to extend 6 
the fundamental principles and established theories of crowdfunding to a health market 7 
context. Crowdfunded health projects can be classified into four types according to the 8 
venture’s purpose and funding method. These are projects covering health expenses, 9 
fundraising health initiatives, supporting health research, or financing commercial health 10 
innovation. Crowdfunding could economically benefit the health sector by expanding 11 
market participation, drawing money and awareness to neglected health issues, 12 
improving access to funding, and fostering project accountability and social 13 
engagement. However, the economic risks of health-related crowdfunding include 14 
inefficient priority setting, heightened financial risk, inconsistent regulatory policies, 15 
intellectual property rights concerns, and fraud. Theorized crowdfunding behaviours 16 
such as signalling and herding can be observed in the market for health-related 17 
crowdfunding. Broader threats of market failure stemming from adverse selection and 18 
moral hazard also apply. Many of the discussed economic benefits and risks of 19 
crowdfunding health campaigns are shared more broadly with those of crowdfunding 20 
projects in other sectors. Where crowdfunding health care appears to diverge from 21 
theory is the negative externality inefficient priority setting may have towards achieving 22 
broader public health goals. Therefore, the market for crowdfunding health care must be 23 
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economically stable, as well as designed to optimally and equitably improve public 24 
health.  25 
 26 
Key words 27 
Crowdfunding, alternative financing, health policy, health economics, global health28 
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INTRODUCTION 29 
 30 
Crowdfunding has recently emerged as an innovative method of financing ventures that 31 
fall outside the purview of traditional capital markets (infoDev, 2013; Kirby & Worner, 32 
2014). Crowdfunding is an alternative channel for financing a project that uses an online 33 
platform to solicit generally small contributions from numerous participants (i.e. the 34 
crowd). Crowdfunding is increasingly being used to bankroll health-related campaigns 35 
(Moran, 2017; "Mind the gap", 2017; Young & Scheinberg, 2017). 36 
 37 
Crowdfunding in the health market presents unique economic applications, benefits, 38 
and risks, which have been inadequately explored. The purpose of this article is to 39 
formulate a helpful typology for crowdfunded health campaigns and review the broad 40 
economic benefits and risks of crowdfunding in the health market. Our typology and 41 
assessment aims to equate the fundamental principles and theory of crowdfunding with 42 
evidence and examples of health-related crowdfunding. This process was informed by a 43 
rapid evidence review and from interviews with selected experts on crowdfunding. 44 
 45 
BACKGROUND 46 
 47 
The fundamental principles and theory of crowdfunding, discussed below, guided the 48 
methodological development of our literature search and interview questions. In 49 
addition, these principles and theoretical lenses provide the sensitizing and inductive 50 
devices used in our empirical analysis. 51 
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 52 
Fundamental principles of crowdfunding 53 
 54 
A crowdfunding transaction involves three key players: the project initiator who is 55 
seeking the funding, the funders who are offering the financing, and the platform 56 
provider who is linking the project initiator with funders through an online forum (Kuti, 57 
2014). The project initiator is not always the beneficiary of the funding and may act as a 58 
representative for another individual. What separates crowdfunding from more 59 
traditional financing mechanisms is the online forum, which provides a uniquely 60 
accessible method of allowing average people to participate in the funding process and 61 
allowing small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to seek funding external from 62 
banks.  63 
 64 
Three funding models typically characterize crowdfunding: reward-based, donation-65 
based, and investment-based. Reward-based crowdfunding asks funders to contribute 66 
money in return for prizes (Belleflamme, Omrani, & Peitz, 2015). Donation-based 67 
crowdfunding involves participants offering philanthropic contributions to a project 68 
(Belleflamme et al., 2015). Finally, investment-based crowdfunding is characterized by 69 
participants providing financing through high-interest loans or in return for an equity-70 
stake in the company (Belleflamme et al., 2015). These tend to be much larger projects 71 
as they present earning potential for funders. 72 
 73 
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Well known crowdfunding platforms include Kickstarter, GoFundMe, Indiegogo, 74 
Crowdcube, and FundRazr. According to Massolution (2015), a US research firm, there 75 
are over 1250 crowdfunding platforms around the world, raising US $16.2 billion in 76 
2014, up 167% from US $6.1 billion the previous year. Massolution estimated that this 77 
growth rate will have held for 2015 with expected crowdfunding volumes to reach US 78 
$34.4 billion by 2016. This progress is generated from growing uptake in North America 79 
and Europe as well as significant growth in Asia. The global crowdfunding market could 80 
be further augmented by up to US $96 billion, unlocked from emerging economies in 81 
Africa, Asia, and South America (infoDev, 2013). While dwarfed by the trillions of dollars 82 
financed through traditional capital markets, these figures demonstrate a growing and 83 
formidable niche market in the financial world (Belleflamme et al., 2015). 84 
 85 
Crowdfunding theory 86 
 87 
Behavioural and economic theory can aid in understanding the recent rise of 88 
crowdfunding, the main benefits from participating, and possible market failures. 89 
According to Agrawal, Catalini, and Goldfarb (2014), crowdfunding has developed as a 90 
result of the commercialization of modern-day Internet. Web 2.0 has lowered the 91 
transaction costs and financial risks of crowdfunding to the point where it is an 92 
economically viable method of financing small ventures. For instance, the Internet 93 
lowers search costs by facilitating cheap, effective, and efficient matching of funders 94 
and project initiators (Agrawal, Catalini, & Goldfarb, 2014). Communication costs are 95 
also lower, allowing funders to easily gather information, monitor their investment, and 96 
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engage with the project initiator, regardless of their geographic location (Agrawal et al., 97 
2014). In addition, the large number of funders accessible through the Internet allows a 98 
project’s risk to be spread over many contributors and permits funders to contribute 99 
small denominations (Agrawal et al., 2014). 100 
 101 
In some circumstances, market participants may prefer crowdfunding over traditional 102 
funding sources (Agrawal et al., 2014). From the project initiator’s perspective, 103 
crowdfunding can lower the cost of accessing capital by: matching project initiators with 104 
funders that have the highest willingness to pay; bundling multiple project goals 105 
together; and generating valuable social media attention. Project initiators may also 106 
view crowdfunding as a way of engaging their customer base and accessing valuable 107 
market information from funders such as customer preferences (Agrawal et al., 2014; 108 
Gerber & Hui, 2013). Funders may participate because they can access affordable 109 
investment opportunities without being an accredited investor, acquire products before 110 
mainstream uptake, participate in the crowdfunding community, support a project that is 111 
important to them, and formalize their contribution through a reputable platform 112 
(Agrawal et al., 2014). The crowdfunding platforms themselves are motivated by the 113 
profit potential generated from nominal and percentage transaction charges on 114 
contributions (Agrawal et al., 2014; Belleflamme et al., 2015). 115 
 116 
However, the market for crowdfunding is susceptible to market inefficiencies that may 117 
impede economically valuable transactions or even cause market failure. The primary 118 
dilemma appears to be asymmetrical information (Agrawal et al., 2014; Belleflamme et 119 
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al., 2015; Belleflamme & Lambert, 2014; Schweinbacher & Larralde, 2012). In reality, 120 
the project creator will know more about the project than the funder. This discrepancy in 121 
information availability is amplified in the crowdfunding setting. Project initiators are 122 
often geographically isolated from their funders whom are often inexperienced in the 123 
project field (Agrawal et al., 2014; Agrawal, Catalini, & Goldfarb, 2015). Thus, the 124 
relationship between funders and the project initiator is described as that of a principal 125 
and agent (Figure 1) (Ley & Weaven, 2011). The project initiator (i.e. the agent) is 126 
essentially paid to carry out the project’s stated goals on behalf of the funders (i.e. the 127 
principal). 128 
 129 
Two chief negative outcomes can arise from a principal-agent relationship: moral 130 
hazard and adverse selection (Agrawal et al., 2014). Moral hazard would describe a 131 
situation where a project initiator acts in self-interest and fails to deliver on project goals 132 
(Agrawal et al., 2014; Strausz, 2016). Given the nature of crowdfunding, funders cannot 133 
easily hold the initiator accountable or may not be privy to information regarding the 134 
project’s progress and success. Adverse selection might occur when high-quality project 135 
initiators consistently choose to access funding through more traditional avenues like 136 
banks, leaving only low-quality ventures in the crowdfunding market pool (Agrawal et 137 
al., 2014). Both moral hazard and adverse selection could drive funders out of the 138 
market. Consequently, signalling is an important aspect of crowdfunding (Belleflamme 139 
et al., 2015). Project initiators will actively signal to potential investors that they have a 140 
high-quality campaign and are committed to fulfilling their stated long-term goals by 141 
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promoting on social media, brandishing past successful projects, and offering prizes to 142 
early contributors. 143 
 144 
Herding behaviour is another consequence of information asymmetry that has been 145 
observed in the crowdfunding market (Agrawal et al., 2014; Belleflamme et al., 2015; E. 146 
Lee & Lee, 2012). Herding occurs when funders collectively make inferences about 147 
project quality based on decisions of other funders. There is a tendency for funders to 148 
swarm projects that are receiving strong support because the crowd perceives these 149 
projects to be higher quality. Several studies suggest that herding behaviour in 150 
crowdfunding can lead to efficient outcomes in certain circumstances (Burtch, Ghose, & 151 
Wattal, 2013; Freedman & Jin, 2008; J. Zhang & Liu, 2012), while another study found 152 
that irrational herding dominates the market (Chen & Lin, 2014). Herding is particularly 153 
problematic when collective funder decisions are made at the expense of conducting 154 
individual due diligence. A free-rider scenario could arise when funders choose to 155 
postpone funding until a project has been vetted by early contributors and reached a 156 
certain threshold indicating quality (Agrawal et al., 2014; Belleflamme et al., 2015; 157 
Boudreau, Jeppesen, Reichstein, & Rullani, 2015). The market could fail if everyone 158 
acts as a free-rider resulting in no projects being fully funded. 159 
 160 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 161 
 162 
Our research has two key objectives: determine how crowdfunding is applied in the 163 
health sector and assess the important economic benefits and risks of crowdfunding in 164 
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the health market. Our research methodology was a rapid evidence review of peer- and 165 
non-peer reviewed literature that was supplemented with targeted interviews with 166 
crowdfunding experts. The literature search and interview questions were informed and 167 
directed by the principles and theories of crowdfunding discussed above. 168 
 169 
We reviewed peer-reviewed articles with use of EconLit, MEDLINE (PubMed), Embase 170 
(Ovid), Scopus, and Web of Science. We used the following search terms across the 171 
above databases: “crowdfund”, “theory”, “model”, “platform”, “reward”, “donation”, 172 
“investment”, “equity”, “loan”, “market failure”, “principle-agent”, “information 173 
asymmetry”, “moral hazard”, “adverse selection”, “herd”, “signal”, “output”, “impact”, 174 
“benefit”, “risk”, and “challenge”.  175 
 176 
The search was restricted to papers published between January 1, 2006 and May 10, 177 
2017, in English, and either journal articles, comments, editorials, or reviews. Following 178 
the initial compilation of search results and removal of duplicates, we further excluded 179 
papers that did not centrally focus on the topic of crowdfunding. Our search identified a 180 
total of 281 unique peer-reviewed papers focusing on crowdfunding.  181 
 182 
A selection of non-peer reviewed literature was incorporated and identified through a 183 
Google search and from citations in key papers. In total, 51 non-peer reviewed texts 184 
were included and consisted of policy documents, working papers, conference 185 
presentations, and consulting reports. Upon reviewing 332 relevant documents, 43 texts 186 
were identified as specifically discussing health-related crowdfunding (Supplementary 187 
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Material). Finally, a review of 25 key crowdfunding websites was conducted to link real 188 
world examples to the literature and theory. 189 
 190 
We performed a series of hour-long telephone interviews with experts in the field of 191 
crowdfunding to validate and complement our conclusions drawn from the literature 192 
review. We used a combination of convenient and judgment sampling to select 193 
interviewees that were accessible and would have professional insight into the political 194 
and regulatory environment of crowdfunding (Marshall, 1996). We chose crowdfunding 195 
policy experts from the US and UK, as these are the two largest crowdfunding markets. 196 
In addition, we solicited input from the OECD to gain a global policy perspective and the 197 
European Crowdfunding Network to gather an industry perspective. Five out of the nine 198 
contacted experts were interviewed. We employed a semi-structured interview protocol 199 
(Supplementary Material) that covered the benefits and challenges of health-related 200 
crowdfunding, the role of regulations and policy, and future market prospects. We then 201 
allowed for unstructured dialogue of relevant topics. We did not believe it was beneficial 202 
for this exploratory review to conduct a larger, systematic interview process of 203 
stakeholders. Due to our small sample size, we did not use a coding system for 204 
interpreting the interviews. 205 
 206 
RESULTS 207 
 208 
A typology for crowdfunding in the global health sector 209 
 210 
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Based on our review, we propose a typology for crowdfunded health projects, which can 211 
be classified into four categories based on the purpose and funding-type of the project 212 
(Table 1). The first can be termed health expenses, which are donation-based 213 
campaigns to fund out-of-pocket expenses for patients unable to afford particular 214 
medical services or products (Sisler, 2012). Examples of crowdfunded health expenses 215 
include cataract surgery, chemotherapy, motorized wheelchairs, and household 216 
accessibility adaptations. GoFundMe, one of the largest donation-based crowdfunding 217 
forums in the world, raised US $147 million for medically-related projects in 2014, up 218 
from US $6 million in 2012 (Cunha, 2015). Their health section for donations is the 219 
platform’s most popular category and generated 26% of all donations in 2014. 220 
 221 
The second type are not-for-profit health initiatives that include fundraising for medical 222 
institutions or charitable organizations, patient education programs, disease awareness 223 
campaigns, and global health missions. Contributions to these crowdfunded campaigns 224 
are typically incentivized through donations or offering rewards. A particularly well-225 
known instance of a crowdfunded health initiative is the 2014 Ice Bucket Challenge, 226 
which supported patients with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis. The project raised over 227 
$115 million towards the ALS Association and Motor Neuron Disease Association 228 
(Chakradhar, 2015). 229 
 230 
The third classification is health research. There is an emerging trend for health 231 
scientists to directly crowdfund donations for their not-for-profit research work (P. P. 232 
Cameron, 2013; Kaplan, 2013; Ozdemir, J, & S, 2015; Otero, 2015; Perlstein, 2013; 233 
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Philippidis, 2013; Vachelard, Gambarra-Soares, Augustini, Riul, & Maracaja-Coutinho, 234 
2016; Wheat, Wang, Byrnes, & Ranganathan, 2013). Crowdfunding, alongside 235 
crowdsourcing, has supported valuable scientific breakthroughs in understanding 236 
human metagenomics and microbiome dynamics (Debelius et al., 2016). Oncology 237 
research has been another major focus for crowdfunding efforts with a number of 238 
platforms dedicated to cancer-specific crowdfunding (Dragojlovic & Lynd, 2014). 239 
 240 
Finally, innovative health care ventures that have commercial potential could access 241 
capital through investment-based, typically equity, crowdfunding. Pharmaceutical and 242 
biotech SMEs as well as spin-off companies from university research groups are using 243 
platforms such as Crowdcube and ShareIn to sell equity stakes in their company in 244 
return for capital (Fiminska, 2015). This money may be used to accelerate clinical 245 
testing and development of a novel therapy, expand health service offerings, or scale-246 
up production and operations for a medical product. 247 
 248 
Economic benefits of health-related crowdfunding 249 
 250 
We identified four major economic benefits of health-related crowdfunding: expanding 251 
market participation, increasing funding access for individuals and SMEs, drawing 252 
awareness and funding to neglected issues, and improving social engagement. Table 2 253 
summarizes these benefits across the four types of health-related crowdfunding.  254 
 255 
1. Expands funder participation in the health market 256 
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 257 
Crowdfunding appears to support and magnify systems of economic sharing on local, 258 
national, and global stages by breaking down institutional barriers and encouraging 259 
active participation (Share the World's Resources, 2014). Light and Briggs argue (2017) 260 
that “crowdfunding platforms collectively change the economic landscape and 261 
enfranchise new pockets of society to contribute and see their choices enacted." 262 
Therefore, rather than redirecting funds through a different financing avenue, health 263 
crowdfunding may leverage globalization and capture new funding that would not have 264 
existed. Snyder et al. (2016) suggests that “compared to the experience people have 265 
when giving or considering donations to a large charitable organization, an individual's 266 
medical crowdfunding initiative can feel much more personal and compelling, leading to 267 
giving that would not have occurred otherwise.” In addition, more inclusive regulations 268 
for investment-based crowdfunding are increasingly permitting non-accredited investors 269 
to participate in the private equity market for biotech companies (Moran, 2017). A 2015 270 
Biocom report estimates that there are over 100 million non-accredited US investors 271 
who could potentially participate in this venture capital market (M. Cameron, Flach, 272 
MacDonald-Korth, Manaktala, & Walker, 2015). 273 
 274 
2. Improves individual and SME access to financial support 275 
 276 
Crowdfunding may improve general access to financial support for SMEs and 277 
individuals (Valančienė & Jegelevičiūtė, 2013). A 2014 UK industry report found that 278 
64% of those who raised money through a donation-based campaign indicated that it 279 
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was ‘unlikely’ or ‘very unlikely’ they would have been able to access funds if alternative 280 
financing was not available (Baeck, Collins, & Zhang, 2014). Similarly, 53% of those 281 
using reward-based campaigns thought obtaining financing through traditional methods 282 
would have been ‘unlikely’ or ‘very unlikely’. The benefit of improved access to funding 283 
is evident in the health sector. In the US, medical expenses were the leading cause of 284 
bankruptcy in 2014 (Himmelstein, Thorne, Warren, & Woolhandler, 2009). 285 
Crowdfunding now averts between an estimated 114 and 136 bankruptcies per quarter 286 
in the US, representing 3.9% of total bankruptcies caused by medical expenses (Burtch 287 
& Chan, 2015). A higher proportion of these US medical expense campaigns are hosted 288 
by patients located in states without the Affordable Care Act Medicaid expansion 289 
(Berliner & Kenworthy, 2017). Moreover, according to the 2015 Biocom analysis of life 290 
science crowdfunding, biotech companies are increasingly relying on investment-based 291 
crowdfunding as a means of raising capital (Wirsching, Laqua, & Colthorpe, 2015). 292 
Between 2010 and 2015, a total of 42 European biotech companies raised €23 million 293 
through crowdfunding. The average amount raised by these companies was €550,000 294 
and multiple companies raised over €1 million. This is a significant trend upwards from 295 
2010 when the average equity-based life science campaign raised €127,000. Some of 296 
these SMEs state that they would not have been able to raise this capital and start their 297 
company without access crowdfunding. 298 
 299 
3. Draws awareness and funding to neglected health issues 300 
 301 
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In the health sector, rare diseases can sometimes be neglected by traditional financing 302 
sources. Crowdfunding may help pull money into these unique funding gaps. A 2016 303 
Pew Research Centre survey found that 84% of donors believe that crowdfunding 304 
“highlights causes or businesses that might not get much attention otherwise ”(Smith, 305 
2016). For instance, GoFundMe’s largest campaign to date raised more than USD $2 306 
million from over 37,000 donors around the world to support a young girl with a very 307 
rare neurological condition, Sanfilippo Syndrome Type A (Young & Scheinberg, 2017). 308 
Additionally, crowdfunding may fill holes in health research agendas by funding niche or 309 
high-risk health science fields. There is building evidence to suggest that crowdfunding 310 
may be an effective method for bringing scientists and donors together to finance early 311 
stage clinical trials targeting rare and neglected diseases (Dragojlovic & Lynd, 2014; 312 
Hawkes & Thomson, 2015; Sharma, Khan, & Devereaux, 2015). Crowdfunding proof-of-313 
concept research and initial clinical trials could allow scientists to attain more substantial 314 
grant funding or entice private investment (Dragojlovic & Lynd, 2014; Orelli, 2012). 315 
 316 
4. Improved social engagement 317 
 318 
In the article “A guide to scientific crowdfunding”, Vachelard et al. (2016) recommend 319 
that engaging the public and their contributors is critical to a campaign’s success. The 320 
most effective initiators tend to provide frequent project updates, reply to funder 321 
inquiries, and harness the power of social media (Belleflamme, Lambert, & 322 
Schwienbacher, 2013; Vachelard et al., 2016). On the other side, funders can see how 323 
the project is progressing, provide input where possible, and monitor the project’s 324 
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practices. Social networks of funders create a community around various projects that 325 
can quickly spread awareness and signal legitimacy to new contributors (Belleflamme et 326 
al., 2015; Lehner & Nicholls, 2014). Moreover, funder feedback delivers early-stage 327 
market testing for those projects that have a product or service output (Belleflamme et 328 
al., 2015). In the health sector, transparency and social engagement are particularly 329 
powerful because funders often have a personal connection with the individual, issue or 330 
business being financed (Smith, 2016). This intrinsic connection fosters openness and 331 
accountability in the crowdfunding relationship (Perlstein, 2013). 332 
 333 
Economic risks of health-related crowdfunding 334 
 335 
Based on our review, we have highlighted five economic risks related to crowdfunding 336 
health projects: inefficient priority setting, financial risks, unclear regulatory frameworks, 337 
issues of accountability, transparency, and due diligence, and risk of fraud and money 338 
laundering. Table 2 summarizes these concerns across the four types of health-related 339 
crowdfunding. 340 
 341 
1. Inefficient health priority setting 342 
 343 
Crowdfunding may be an inefficient method of health priority setting and allocation of 344 
financing because decisions may be determined by funder sentiment and swayed by 345 
behavioural economic principles such as signalling and herding (Agrawal et al., 2014; 346 
Belleflamme et al., 2015). An increasing number of life science researchers and patients 347 
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are turning to social media to solicit donations and attention for their campaign (Berliner 348 
& Kenworthy, 2017; Vachelard et al., 2016). The success of a research project or 349 
medical expense campaign is often largely based on an initiators ability to tap social 350 
networks (Barclay, 2012; Byrnes, et al., 2014). There is concern that this may come at 351 
the cost of determining health research financing based on scientific merit or health care 352 
funding based on clinical need (Del Savio, 2017; Snyder, 2016). Moreover, allowing 353 
patients to crowdfund or pay to participate in clinical trials poses an especially difficult 354 
ethical and economic dilemma. Patients may tend to support the short-term goals of a 355 
new intervention at the potential expense of longer-term medical evidence production 356 
(Wenner, Kimmelman, & London, 2015). In addition, crowdfunded clinical trials may not 357 
go through the same rigorous peer-review process as publicly funded trials to validate 358 
preclinical evidence (Wenner, Kimmelman, & London, 2015). 359 
 360 
2. Financial risks 361 
 362 
An increasing number of countries are amending regulations to allow non-accredited 363 
investors to participate in investment-based crowdfunding (Cusmano, 2015; Hemmadi, 364 
2015). However, introducing non-accredited investors to private equity investing and 365 
lending may expose inexperienced retail investors to more financial risk than they are 366 
aware (Kirby & Worner, 2014; Pazowski & Czudec, 2014). Start-up businesses seeking 367 
equity investment often have failure rates between 75% and 90% in the first five years 368 
(Hemmadi, 2015). Crowdfunded loans are often unsecured and there is minimal liquidity 369 
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in the investment-based crowdfunding market, which has no secondary market 370 
(Hemmadi, 2015). 371 
 372 
Financial risks also apply to donation- and reward-based crowdfunding campaigns 373 
where there is the possibility that a backed project does not produce its projected goal. 374 
Kickstarter, a reward-based platform, noted that 25% of start-up projects failed in the 375 
first year, 55% failed by year 5, and 71% failed by year 10 (“Investors navigate the risks 376 
of crowdfunding,” 2015). In cases where reward-based projects do not actually fail, the 377 
majority of campaigns do not deliver their reward on time. A 2014 study of 48,500 378 
crowdfunded projects found that over 75% delivered their products later than originally 379 
promised (Mollick, 2014). 380 
 381 
Another financial concern is that transaction fees levied by platform providers may be a 382 
source of economic inefficiency. Investment-based crowdfunding platforms typically 383 
charge around 5% on funds raised, which is in line with what major banks charge on 384 
initial public offerings (5 – 7%) (Belleflamme et al., 2015; PricewaterhouseCoopers, 385 
2012). However, some donation-based and reward-based crowdfunding platforms seem 386 
to charge higher transaction fees on funds raised. For example, GoFundMe has a 5% 387 
participation fee, a 2.9% processing fee, and a flat 30 cent charge on all donations 388 
(Belleflamme et al., 2015). An average $10 donation with GoFundMe would incur a 389 
10.9% charge. Kisskissbankbank, a popular French platform, charges a 5% commission 390 
plus a 3% bank fee, creating a total transaction fee of 8% (Belleflamme et al., 2015). 391 
 392 
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3. Unclear regulatory framework 393 
 394 
Existing regulatory definitions of crowdfunding appear to be ill-defined and there is little 395 
consensus among policy-makers regarding what should fall under existing and future 396 
crowdfunding regulation (INT-2, INT-3) (Cusmano, 2015). All the interviewed experts 397 
could not specify a country that employed a particularly enabling policy environment for 398 
crowdfunding that could guide future regulation development (INT-1, INT-2, INT-3, INT-399 
4, INT-5). Regulators may be operating with limited knowledge and experience (INT-2, 400 
INT-3) and risk applying the wrong policy frameworks to differing crowdfunding models. 401 
This confusion is particularly evident with regards to peer-to-peer lending and 402 
crowdfunding securities, which often fall under the same regulations (European 403 
Crowdfunding Network, 2014). 404 
 405 
Determining appropriate regulations for equity-based crowdfunding appears to be 406 
particularly challenging given its potential for economic impact (INT-1, INT-5). Important 407 
regulatory considerations include the size of equity offerings, capital requirements, 408 
registration with the national licensing authority, the number of investors per offer, 409 
restrictions on who can invest, and controls on how much they can invest (Kirby & 410 
Worner, 2014). Moreover, a common set of legal frameworks has not been established 411 
across borders (European Crowdfunding Network, 2014; Gabison, 2015). Countries 412 
frequently have divergent taxation and tax incentivization schemes for international 413 
platforms (European Commission, 2014). Finally, it is unclear the degree of liability 414 
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international platform providers hold for screening risky, incompetent, unethical, or 415 
illegal projects (INT-2, INT-3). 416 
 417 
These challenging questions are being discussed by government agencies like the 418 
European Commission, US Securities and Exchange Commission, UK Financial 419 
Conduct Authority, the Ontario Securities Commission, and the Australian Corporations 420 
and Markets Advisory Committee (Cusmano, 2015; Wirsching et al., 2015). There does 421 
not appear to be a practical role for a global crowdfunding regulator, but it seems that 422 
there is a trend towards international harmonization of crowdfunding regulation (INT-1, 423 
INT-2, INT-3). Large multinational banks, who perceive the crowdfunding market to 424 
have an unfair advantage over traditional capital markets, are responsible for increasing 425 
pressure and lobbying of regulators to further limit crowdfunding (INT-2, INT-3). Despite 426 
this, large banks are entering the crowdfunding space, which has benefited from years 427 
of low regulation. 428 
 429 
The increasing regulation of the equity crowdfunding market is spilling into the non-430 
investment markets. In the US, there are currently no specific policies or laws that 431 
govern donation- and reward-based crowdfunding (INT-1). But, the Federal Trade 432 
Commission and Association of United States Attorneys is now exploring ways to 433 
respond to the growing incidence of fraud on donation- and reward-based platforms 434 
(INT-1).  435 
 436 
4. Issues of accountability, transparency, and due diligence 437 
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 438 
The anonymity, geographic distance, and information asymmetry between funders and 439 
project initiators makes it challenging to ensure accountability, transparency, and due 440 
diligence across all projects (Agrawal et al., 2014; Kirby & Worner, 2014). Much of this 441 
responsibility falls on project initiators to provide necessary information to contributors 442 
and to fulfil the project’s stated objectives (Agrawal et al., 2014). However, project 443 
initiators can avoid their responsibilities and there is a risk that contributors could lose 444 
their capacity to hold initiators accountable. Even when project information is made 445 
readily available, project goals can be vague or have unclear metrics on which 446 
contributors can gauge project progress or success. In addition, the average 447 
contribution is often small thereby reducing individual contributors’ incentive to hold 448 
initiators accountable (Agrawal et al., 2014). Platform providers are increasingly 449 
expected to provide some screening, rule setting, and information to protect contributors 450 
from incompetent project initiators and to help contributors make informed decisions 451 
(Belleflamme et al., 2015). 452 
 453 
An important issue related to transparency is intellectual property rights. Crowdfunded 454 
health and biotechnology start-ups are at risk for having their intellectual property stolen 455 
or plagiarized by others on the Web (European Commission, 2014). In the US, Title III 456 
of the JOBS Act requires equity-based crowdfunded projects to disclose detailed reports 457 
of company operations and finances to its investors (112th US Congress, 2012). The 458 
project initiator must therefore balance their responsibilities of disclosure with the 459 
dangers of divulging proprietary information or company details to market competitors 460 
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(Adams & Constantine, 2015). There is concern that disclosure of any proprietary 461 
information to funders may constitute as prior art, thus barring the initiator from claiming 462 
patent rights in the future (Adams & Constantine, 2015). While there are exemptions in 463 
the US that would allow project initiators to patent their invention post-crowdfundraising, 464 
many foreign patent systems do not have the same leniencies (INT-2). Finally, it is 465 
important to recognize the expansive trademark and copyright entitlements platform 466 
providers attain through hosting a campaign (Adams & Constantine, 2015). 467 
 468 
5. Risk of fraud and money laundering 469 
 470 
Online crowdfunding leaves contributors susceptible to fraud because traditional legal 471 
and reputation security measures may not work (Gabison, 2015). There have been 472 
several legal cases against crowdfunders whom fraudulently collected donations for a 473 
medical condition they did not have (Snyder, 2016). The relatively small average 474 
contribution and anonymity of the project initiator disincentivizes legal action in the 475 
event of fraudulent behaviour (Agrawal et al., 2014). Also, initiators often do not have 476 
the same traditional motivation to protect their reputation and goodwill because they are 477 
anonymous and frequently one-off participants. There appears to be some risk for 478 
money laundering, which could support narcotics deals, terrorism, and other illegal 479 
activities (Robock, 2014). Both fraud and money laundering seem to be rare and do not 480 
significantly discourage people from participating in crowdfunding (European 481 
Commission, 2014). Nonetheless, states are working to further develop anti-fraud and 482 
anti-money laundering safeguards (INT 01) (European Commission, 2014). 483 
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 484 
DISCUSSION 485 
 486 
Health policy makers need to be aware of and understand the growing economic impact 487 
of health-related crowdfunding. Countries will likely continue to embrace health-related 488 
crowdfunding because it expands health market participation, improves individual and 489 
SME access to funding, pulls funding to neglected health issues, and encourages 490 
project accountability and community engagement. Regulators in North America and 491 
Europe are working to delineate regulatory systems that integrate crowdfunding into 492 
their existing financial markets (European Crowdfunding Network, 2014). However, 493 
policy makers are faced with market risks that could impact the health sector such as 494 
inefficient priority setting, heightened financial risk, inconsistent regulatory policies, 495 
intellectual property rights concerns, and fraud. Self-regulation within the crowdfunding 496 
community may serve to compliment formal policy. Professional accreditation (e.g. 497 
Crowdfunding Accreditation for Platform Standards) and systems for tracking fraudulent 498 
campaigns exist (e.g. www.gofraudme.org), however these programs do not seem 499 
widely recognized or utilized. 500 
 501 
Crowdfunding theory and the principle-agent relationship are useful tools for 502 
understanding crowdfunding in the health sector. Theorized crowdfunding behaviours 503 
such as signalling and herding are likely present in the market for crowdfunding health. 504 
In addition, broader threats of market failure stemming from adverse selection and 505 
moral hazard may also apply. Consequently, many of the discussed benefits and risks 506 
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of crowdfunding health campaigns are shared more broadly with those of crowdfunding 507 
projects in other sectors. Equity-based projects seem particularly prone to market 508 
failures due to the financial sensitivity of their investors and the greater size of the 509 
potential market compared to those of reward- or donation-based campaigns. 510 
Therefore, the outlined economic risks in this paper may apply more significantly to 511 
equity-based projects in health care.  512 
 513 
Where crowdfunding in health appears to diverge from generalized crowdfunding theory 514 
is the negative externality inefficient priority setting may have towards achieving broader 515 
public health goals. Where most of the highlighted benefits and risks focus on 516 
crowdfunding participants, the issue of inefficient priority setting could affect the health 517 
of people beyond the crowdfunding market. Scientific research, social initiatives, and 518 
innovation in health care have a uniquely direct impact on individuals suffering from 519 
medical conditions. Therefore, this new market for health cannot just be economically 520 
stable; it must also be designed to optimally and equitably improve public health. 521 
 522 
Policy makers in countries with insurance gaps and inadequate universal health care 523 
coverage must realize that health-related crowdfunding is often a symptom of gaps in 524 
health policy. Individuals crowdfund their medical expenses because health insurance 525 
coverage in their country is incomplete (Snyder, 2016); scientists turn to crowdfunding 526 
as public grant funding declines and pharmaceutical companies de-risk their R&D 527 
portfolios (Dragojlovic & Lynd, 2014); start-up entrepreneurs solicit the ‘crowd’ because 528 
they are unable to access capital through conventional avenues (Wirsching et al., 529 
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2015). It seems impractical to patch all these gaps in access to financing using 530 
crowdfunding. It is our opinion that crowdfunding is a complimentary financing tool in 531 
health care that can offer interim financial relief while improved policies are designed 532 
and implemented. Particularly troublesome is the inordinate number of crowdfunding 533 
projects for covering medical expenses, highlighting the need for improved health 534 
insurance coverage around the world. While altruistic crowdfunding partially fills this 535 
medical insurance gap, it should not be thought of as a practical method for mitigating 536 
user charges and attaining universal health coverage in any country, particularly 537 
developing countries.  538 
 539 
Crowdfunding could play a more valuable role in health science research, non-profit 540 
health initiatives, and commercial innovation. Crowdfunding offers the possibility of 541 
much needed access to funding for scientists that can make important contributions to 542 
often-neglected medical research. Valuable non-profit health programs are additionally 543 
benefiting from new financing driven by crowdfunding. We believe this opportunity to 544 
expand funding for non-profit health ventures should be better guided by sound 545 
evidence and health priority setting, which are often lacking in the current system. 546 
Crowdfunding for-profit health ventures also seems promising and allows SMEs to more 547 
effectively compete in the health sector. At present, the scalability of health care 548 
crowdfunding appears generally capped at projects under €1 million (Moran, 2017). 549 
However, crowdfunding may allow health researchers and SMEs to validate the 550 
worthiness or profitability of their venture to larger companies and major private 551 
investors thereby opening access to additional financing. Regulators look to be moving 552 
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in the right direction by trying to improve the market’s stability, but it appears there is a 553 
need for greater legal and regulatory harmonization across borders. Additionally, the 554 
risk of illegal activity could threaten needed confidence in the fledgling crowdfunding 555 
market and, thus policy makers must approach this issue seriously.  556 
 557 
Many of the economic risks stem, at least in part, from the principal-agent relationship 558 
and the associated information asymmetry. Thus, there could be an important role for 559 
targeted regulation that minimizes steep information asymmetry gradients between 560 
initiators and funders. For instance, it may be valuable to have a credentialing body 561 
endorsed by relevant scientific associations that could certify a crowdfunding project’s 562 
credibility and rate the project’s health care value. In parallel, a financial regulatory 563 
agency specific to crowdfunding could assess project financial riskiness, impose 564 
solvency requirements on funders and initiators, monitor illegal activity, regulate 565 
transaction charges levied by platforms, and ensure platform transparency. In this way, 566 
public health objectives could be fostered and the market’s economic stability could be 567 
strengthened. 568 
 569 
There are a couple limitations to this review. First, the simple sampling strategy used to 570 
solicit interviews does not capture the full range of stakeholders in the crowdfunding 571 
market. This sampling technique was only used to validate and compliment the main 572 
results from our rapid evidence review. It is our hope that a comprehensive primary 573 
research project employing a rigorous interviewing protocol will build on this introductory 574 
review. Second, this review solely focuses on the economic issues of crowdfunding 575 
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health care; there are a variety of important ethical and social issues, discussed in other 576 
articles, that we do not broach such as equity, access, autonomy, and privacy (Berliner 577 
& Kenworthy, 2017; Shaw et al., 2016; Snyder, 2016; Snyder, Mathers, & Crooks, 578 
2016). Understanding the role of these other aspects in conjunction with the economic 579 
issues we raise is critical to understanding the complete set of benefits and risks of 580 
crowdfunding health care, especially crowdfunding medical expenses. 581 
 582 
CONCLUSION 583 
 584 
This review demonstrates that crowdfunding plays a unique and growing role in the 585 
global health sector. There appears to be four major types of crowdfunded health 586 
projects that present important economic benefits and risks. The limited scope of 587 
literature on this topic indicates that the importance of health-related crowdfunding may 588 
be underappreciated. Consequently, as crowdfunding seizes a larger role in health care, 589 
there will be a need for greater academic scrutiny and scholarship in this field. Research 590 
in health-related crowdfunding can support evidence-based policy frameworks that 591 
enhance the health sector and allow it to evolve with crowdfunding. A valuable first step 592 
would be a comprehensive mapping and quantification of health-related crowdfunding 593 
campaigns with the goal of identifying measures to mitigate the economic risks 594 
identified in this review. 595 
 596 
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Project type Definition Financing 
method 
Project examples Platform examples 
Health 
expenses 
Crowdfunded health 
projects that finance an 
individual’s out-of-pocket 
expenses for medical 
services and products 
Donation-
based 
Surgery, chemotherapy, 
rehabilitative care, and 
mobility & accessibility 
adaptations 
GoFundMe; Indiegogo; 
Watsi; Crowdfund Health; 
YouCaring; GiveForward 
Health 
initiatives 
Crowdfunded not-for-
profit health initiatives 
that provide benefit to the 
wider public or a specific 
group of people. 
Donation-
based; 
Reward-
based 
Charitable fundraising, 
patient education 
programs, and disease 
awareness campaigns 
KickStarter; Indiegogo, 
MedStartr 
Health 
research 
Crowdfunded not-profit-
profit health research that 
typically focuses on 
treatments for rare or 
neglected diseases.  
Donation-
based 
Basic health science 
research, genomic 
studies, and preclinical & 
early clinical studies 
MyProjects; Consano; 
Cure Cancer Starter; 
Experiment; RocketHub; 
StartACure; 
WhenYouWish; Cancer 
Research UK; Give To 
Cure 
Commercial 
health 
innovation 
Crowdfunded for-profit 
health ventures that need 
additional capital to get 
off the ground.  
Investment-
based 
Drug development, 
therapy innovations, and 
complimentary & 
alternative medical 
treatments 
Crowdcube; ShareIn; 
MedStartr; Healthios 
Xchange; Wiseed; 
Venture Health; 
Homestrings 
Table 1. A typology of crowdfunded health projects 
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Project type Benefits Risks 
Health 
expenses 
(Donation-
based) 
• Expands the pool of potential donors 
• Draws money and attention to neglected 
and under-supported medical conditions 
• Partially fills gap in medical care coverage 
for patients in need 
• Backers can provide support community for 
the patient 
• Asymmetrical information and poor project 
transparency makes it difficult for backers to 
ensure project accountability  
• Risk of fraud and money laundering 
• High transaction fees charged by platform 
may make crowdfunding an inefficient 
method of financing 
Health 
initiatives 
(Donation-
based; 
Reward-
based) 
• Expands the pool of potential donors 
• Draws money and attention to neglected 
and under-supported health care issues 
• Partially fills gap in access to financing for 
SMEs and individuals 
• Backers can hold project initiators 
accountable & be engaged in initiative 
progress 
• Asymmetrical information and poor project 
transparency can make it difficult for 
backers to ensure project accountability 
• Risk of fraud and money laundering 
• High transaction fees charged by platform 
may make crowdfunding an inefficient 
method of financing 
Health 
research 
(Donation-
based) 
• Expands the pool of potential donors 
• Draws money and attention to neglected 
and under-supported health research 
• Partially fills gap in public and private 
funding of health research 
• Backers can hold researchers accountable 
and be engaged in research progress 
• Community unlikely able to efficiently select 
high-priority projects from a public health 
perspective 
• Research projects may not be funded based 
on scientific merit 
• Ethical dilemma created when patients can 
fund and participate in research pertinent to 
their own treatment 
• Backer short-term goals can supersede 
more important long-term research goals 
• Asymmetrical information and poor project 
transparency can make it difficult for 
backers to ensure project accountability 
• Risk of fraud and money laundering 
• High transaction fees charged by platform 
may make crowdfunding an inefficient 
method of financing 
Commercial 
health 
innovation 
(Investment-
based) 
• Allows non-accredited investors to access 
the private equity market 
• Draws money and attention to neglected 
and under-supported health innovation 
• Partially fills gap in access to financing for 
SMEs 
• Backers can hold SMEs accountable and be 
engaged in development progress 
• Backers can offer additional expertise, 
resources, and support for SMEs 
• Backers may not have expertise to 
efficiently select profitable projects 
• Community unlikely able to efficiently select 
high-priority projects from a public health 
perspective 
• High risk of project failure and backers 
losing their financial investment 
• Asymmetrical information and poor project 
transparency can make it difficult for 
backers to ensure project accountability 
• Laws and regulation of equity-based 
crowdfunding is limited in many countries 
• Concerns of intellectual property rights 
protection limit the applicability of 
crowdfunding innovative ideas 
• Risk of fraud and money laundering 
• High transaction fees charged by platforms 
may make crowdfunding a relatively 
inefficient method of financing compared to 
traditional financing avenues 
Table 2. Key economic benefits and concerns across the types of crowdfunded health 
projects  
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Figure 1. Information asymmetry in crowdfunding 
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RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS  
·  There has been a rapid uptake of crowdfunding in the global health sector  
·  Crowdfunding finances health expenses, initiatives, research, and innovation  
·  There are several possible economic benefits and risks of crowdfunding the health market  
·  Regulations should facilitate stability and efficiency in the crowdfunding market  
·  The market for crowdfunding health should be designed to improve public health  
 
